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Ellenby: Title VII

ARTICLE

DIVINITY VS. DISCRIMINATION:
CURTAILING THE DIVINE REACH
OF CHURCH AUTHORITY
WHITNEY ELLENBY·

I. INTRODUCTION
Church authority to practice gender discrimination in
employment decisions represents the collision of principles of
religious liberty on one hand, and the need to eradicate invidious discrimination on the other. In order to secure the free
exercise of religion, the First Amendment prohibits legislation
which interferes with or significantly abridges religious belief
or conduct. 1 To the extent that employment decisions represent the extension of religious belief, churches have a strong
claim of immunity from judicial review of their decisions. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 thus exempts religious
entities from civil liability when their discriminatory conduct is
religiously motivated. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)
states:

* J.D. 1995, Georgetown University Law Center. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of all those whose efforts made publishing this article
possible; my parents, for their unconditional patience and support; Professor David
Saperstein, Dean Mark Tushnet and Ronnie London for their outstanding editing;
and Professor Oliver Thomas, without whom this article would never have been
written.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988).
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This subchapter shall not apply. . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution,
or society of its activities. 3

While such accommodation arguably runs afoul of non-establishment principles of the First Amendment\ the Supreme
Court in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos5 unanimously held that the exemption did not rise to the level of a
law respecting an establishment of religion. 6
Although the Supreme Court has not recognized a constitutional right to discriminate on the basis of religion against
individuals who perform purely "secular" functions, the court
has upheld Title VII's statutory exemption for discriminating
with respect to "religious" functions. 7 Title VII has been interpreted to bar race and sex discrimination by religious organizations toward their non-minister employees; yet, attempting
to forbid religious discrimination against non-minister employees where the position involved has any religious significance
is uniformly recognized as constitutionally suspect, if not forbidden. 8
Notwithstanding Amos, the statutory exemption still engenders considerable controversy among federal courts left to

3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a)(1988).
4. See infra notes 104-160 discussing the Establishment Clause.
5. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
6. [d. at 338. In Amos, a building engineer was discharged by The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints after 16 years of service because he failed to
qualify for a church certificate. [d. at 330. The District Court held that the exemption applied thereby allowing the Church to discriminate against the building
engineer. See id. at 333. The Supreme Court reversed after reasoning that
"[w]here, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation
that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities. [d. at 338.
7. [d. at 338. See also McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 896 (1972); infra notes 25-67 and accompanying text
discussing McClure.
8. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980);
Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 627 F. Supp. 1499 (E.D. Wis. 1986); Little v. Wuerl,
929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991).
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interpret its precise scope. 9 While the statute permits religious
institutions to engage in religious discrimination, the legal
boundaries between religious and other forms of prohibited discrimination, such as gender discrimination, remain unclear.
Specifically, the vague guidelines give rise to such questions as
how "religious" an institution must be to qualify for the exemption, or whether employment decisions constitute the type of
"activities" courts are precluded from overseeing.
Under current federal court jurisprudence, church authority to discriminate along gender lines, and the corresponding
authority of courts to review and regulate such conduct, turns
largely on two considerations: the nature of the institution and
the nature of the employment position.lO The various employment positions can be broken down into four distinct categories
of cases: (1) ministerial functions in pervasively sectarian institutions; (2) ministerial functions in religiously-affiliated institutions; (3) non-ministerial functions in pervasively sectarian
institutions; and (4) non-ministerial functions in religiouslyaffiliated institutions. 11 Such classifications are useful in determining at precisely what level the responsibilities assumed
by employees are so secular in nature that state regulation of
employment decisions regarding those positions cannot be
contested on religious grounds.
Church authority to discriminate in employing ministers
in both pervasively sectarian and religiously-affiliated institutions is undisputed. 12 Such decisions involve religious deter-

9. See infra note 14.
10. This is a general proposition set forth by Oliver Thomas, former counsel to
the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and an Adjunct Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center. Thomas' views regarding the application of
anti-discrimination laws to religious institutions were first presented to the ABA
Conference on Religion in Public Life, University of Pennsylvania, May 31, 1991
and were subsequently printed in the Journal of the National Administrative Law
Judges.
Because this comment argues that both religiously-affiliated and pervasively
sectarian institutions should be subject to anti-discrimination law, less emphasis
will be placed on the nature of the institution.
11. Oliver s. Thomas, The Application of Anti-Discrimination Laws to Religious
Institutions: The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object, 12 J. NATL Assoc.
ADMIN. LAw JUDGES 83 (1992). For the purposes of this note, the author will use
the terms "sectarian" and "religious" interchangeably.
12. The proposition that such decisions lie beyond the jurisdiction of civil
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minations which lie at the "core" of church doctrine, and thus,
all courts agree that these decisions are covered by the church
autonomy doctrine. 13 The courts' position with respect to nonministerial functions, however, remains unclear. In general,
federal courts reviewing employment decisions at this level
continue to resort to case-by-case analysis of the particular
facts at hand. In the absence of any meaningful guidelines
from the Supreme Court, lower courts, which must determine
the religious nature of an employee's position, must rely upon
standards set by previous courts grappling with this issue.
This method of resolving discrimination disputes has led courts
to reach different conclusions on ostensibly similar facts.14
Given the need for a coherent policy in this area, courts
should look to the recent line of federal cases which apply Title
VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter "ADEA")15 to employment discrimination disputes. 16
These decisions, along with the strong policy arguments
against gender discrimination, mandate that both religiouslyaffiliated and pervasively sectarian institutions cannot justify
sex discrimination with respect to employees who perform non-

courts finds ample support in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976), and remains uncontested by federal courts as well as proponents of the application of anti-discrimination law to religious institutions. In
Milivojevich, the Court addressed the decision of the Mother Church of the Serbian
Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia to suspend and defrock Bishop Milivojevich. [d. at
697-98. The Illinois Supreme Court had ordered reinstatement of the Bishop based
upon its finding that the Church had failed to comply with prescribed Church
procedure. [d. at 698. The Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two vote, reversed and
determined that the decision by the Illinois Court, to substitute its interpretation
of the Church's doctrine for that of the Church itself, represented an impermissible
encroachment of civil authority into ecclesiastical law. [d. at 720.
13. See McClure, 460 F.2d 553 (holding that "the relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood.").
14. Compare Dayton Christian Schs. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F.Supp.
1004 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that Commission is precluded by the First Amendment from reviewing sex discrimination claim of parochial school teacher) with
Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1992) (holding that investigative
review of discrimination claim by four nuns against parochial school did not violate the Free Exercise Clause) and EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding that mandatory compliance with investigative review of a discrimination
claim by a potential female employee did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or
the Establishment Clause).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
16. See infra note 28 listing federal cases.
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ministerial functions. 17 Such a judicial policy not only survives scrutiny under First Amendment principles, but is consistent with recent federal decisions concerning church autonomy.
This comment will first demonstrate that compliance with
Title VII at the non-ministerial level does not infringe upon
the Free Exercise rights of a religious institution absent specific doctrinal authority within the institution compelling discrimination at that leve1. 18 This comment will next argue that not
only does the Establishment Clause permit compliance with
Title VII, but allowing religious institutions to avoid Title VII
requirements contradicts the non-establishment principle
which the clause itself prohibits. 19 Finally, this comment will
argue that principles of church autonomy do not constrain
judicial resolution of employment disputes under Title VII,
because such disputes represent essentially secular rather
than ecclesiastical controversies. 20

17. A related topic to the one discussed involves those incidents in which nonministerial employees are discriminated against based on religion and indirectly on
gender. For instance, an issue might arise in which a single woman employed by
a church in a non-ministerial capacity is found to have committed a religious
violation, i.e. becoming pregnant or having an abortion, which is uniquely genderbased as well. If she is fired on the basis of her religious violation, an interesting
issue is whether given the unique nature of her violation, Title VII should allow
her to sue the church for wrongful termination on the basis of gender. Although
this presents a complicated issue which lies beyond the scope of this paper, it is
the author's opinion that a Title VII claim would not be appropriate under such
circumstances. Where the employee has agreed to follow the religious doctrine in
issue, it would seem that the church's Free Exercise right to demand adherence to
official doctrine would, despite competing Title VII mandates, be seriously jeopardized if those who purport to follow or in any way carry out that religious doctrine are
permitted to challenge it on civil grounds when they violate that doctrine.
18. See supra notes 21-103 and accompanying text discussing the Free Exercise
Clause.
19. See supra notes 104-160 and accompanying text discussing the Establishment Clause.
20. See supra notes 166-237 and accompanying text discussing church autonomy principles.
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II. FREE EXERCISE ANALYSIS
The Free Exercise Clause21 ensures that those who hold
religious beliefs are not impermissibly burdened by government regulation in the exercise of those beliefs. This right to
remain free of state interference applies not only to beliefs, but
extends to religious conduct as well. 22 The relevance of this
"belief-action" distinction to the employment context is clear: a
belief which presumes inferior status and capability of women
is hollow unless it is translated into practice by denying women access to positions commensurate with men. While the Free
Exercise Clause governs such practice, it is not clear that it
protects it.
In applying anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII to
religious authorities under the traditional Free Exercise test
crafted by the Supreme Court, courts may consider: first, the
magnitude of the statute's burden upon the exercise of the
religious belief; second, the possible existence of a compelling
state interest justifying the burden imposed; and finally, the
extent to which recognition of an exemption from the statute
would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the
state. 23 Such an analysis demonstrates that holding religious
institutions accountable for gender discrimination at the nonministerial level does not run afoul of their Free Exercise
rights; to the contrary, because churches in the vast majority

21. u.s. CONST. amend. I.
22. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder involved a claim by
the Amish parents of elementary-aged children that Wisconsin's compulsory schoolattendance statute abridged their Free Exercise right to educate their children in
a manner consistent with their religious beliefs. [d. at 207. Holding in favor of the
parents, the Court recognized that the guarantee of Free Exercise was a shallow
freedom absent the right to engage in religious conduct. [d. at 219-20.
23. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-10 (1963). At issue in Sherbert was
the right of state law to deny unemployment compensation to a Seventh-Day
Adventist who failed to obtain employment because of her religiously-motivated
refusal to work on Saturday. [d. at 399-402. The Court recognized that the effect
of the state law was to force the individual to make a cruel choice between foregoing government benefits or violating her religious beliefs. [d. at 404. The Court
thus held the statute invalid, reasoning that a state statute which seeks to advance legitimate secular goals is required to use the least-restrictive means available for achieving its legislative goal. [d. at 407. In this case, the Court determined that exemption from the statute for religiously-compelled refusal to work
presented such an alternative. [d. at 408-409.
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of cases cannot defend such practice on religious grounds,
requiring them to use non-discriminatory criteria imposes
little, if any, burden on their actual beliefs.
A. DETERMINING WHETHER APPLICATION

OF TITLE VII
IMPERMISIBLY BURDENS FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

To determine the magnitude of the burden imposed by
anti-discrimination laws at the nonministerial level, courts
must address two interrelated inquiries: whether sex discrimination at the non-ministerial level may be justified on religious
grounds, and, if so, the extent to which the religious purpose of
an institution will be undermined if it is forced to accommodate Title VII objectives. 24 Because the Supreme Court has
not directly addressed this issue, however, the most useful
guidelines for addressing such inquiries appear in recent lower
federal court decisions.
1. The "Church-Minister" Exception To Application Of Title
VII Under McClure
The Fifth Circuit's decision in McClure v. Salvation Army25 is particularly instructive on the magnitude of the bur-

den imposed by anti-discrimination laws at the nonministerial
level because it established the standards for determining
which religious entities and employment positions should be
exempted from Title VII strictures. In McClure the Fifth Circuit reviewed a sex discrimination claim of a female officer
employed by the Salvation Army.26 Alleging a Title VII violation, the officer sought review of unequal wage compensation
and her subsequent discharge after reporting the unequal
payment.27 In an opinion which influenced a significant line of
case law,28 the Fifth Circuit denied review of unequal wage
24. The first of these inquiries reflects the statutory exemption principles of 42
§ 2000e-1(a) which exempts religiously motivated discriminatory conduct.
The second inquiry reflects the extent to which compliance with Title VII would
result in an impermissible burden on the Free Exercise rights of the religious
institution involved.
25. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
26. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.
27. Id.
28. The far-reaching significance of McClure is demonstrated by the progeny of

u.s.c.
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compensation. 29 Concluding that the Salvation Army was a
religious association, the court relied upon Free Exercise principles to carve out a "church-minister" exception to Title VII. 30
The court identified the "church-minister" relationship as representing the "lifeblood" of the church; thus, any attempt to
resolve the present employment dispute would be an impermissible intrusion into a "prime ecclesiastical concern.,,31 Because
the officer's duties included clergy-like responsibilities, her
position fell within the exception. 32
Following McClure, a substantial number of federal and
state courts have similarly approached employment discrimination disputes by first determining whether the institution is so
pervasively sectarian as to be classified a "church" and then
determining whether the nature of the employment position is
sufficiently related to "core" religious doctrine so as to justify
discrimination. 33 Where the employee's position advances an
institution's religious mission, it is more likely to be covered by
the exception. 34
The language in McClure strictly forbids judicial encroachment into religious matters.35 Thus it would appear that
courts would refrain from entertaining doubts regarding an
employees' functions and resolve ambiguous issues in favor of

cases using the McClure "church-minister" exception to resolve employment-related
disputes. Cases following the McClure approach include EEOC v. Pacific Press
Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981);
EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 609 F.Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Russell v.
Belmont College, 554 F.Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Dolter v. Walhert High
School, 483 F.Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980); Whatney v. Greater New York Corp of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F.Supp. 1363 (S.D. N.Y. 1975); Marshall v. Pacific
Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7806
(C.D. Cal. 1977).
29. [d. at 560-61.
30. [d. at 560.
31. [d. at 558-59.
32. See id. at 555, 560.
33. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pac. Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.
1982); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 609 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Dolter
v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980); Russell v. Belmont
College, 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Whitney v. Greater New York Corp.
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
34. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976).
35. See McClure, 460 F.2d at 559-60.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/5

8

Ellenby: Title VII

1996]

TITLE VII

377

the church. The tendency in the federal courts, however, has
been to adopt a restrictive interpretation of what constitutes
"ministerial functions."36 This interpretation demonstrates the
courts' unwillingness to permit both religiously-affiliated and
pervasively sectarian institutions fail to overcome even the
initial hurdle of the Free Exercise test.
2. Narrow Construction Of The "Church-Minister" Exception

Soon after the McClure 37 decision, the Fifth Circuit once
again confronted the application of anti-discrimination laws to
a religious entity in EEOC u. Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary.3s In Southwestern Baptist, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") sued to enforce
the Seminary's compliance with the Commission's reporting
requirements. 39 The Seminary had resisted on the grounds
that the reports sought by the EEOC concerned employees who
fell under the church-minister exception. 40 Finding the seminary to be a "church" for McClure purposes, the court nevertheless rejected the Seminary's argument. 41
The Fifth Circuit demonstrated how narrowly it was willing to construe the "ministerial" exception when it held that
maintenance and plant employees were not encompassed by
the exception even though four of these staff members were
actually ordained ministers.42 Because its employees were excluded from the "church-minister" exception, the Seminary
36. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pac. Press Publishing Ass'n., 676 F.2d 1272; EEOC v.
Fremont Christian Sch., 609 F. Supp. 344; Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F.
Supp. 266; Russell v. Belmont College, 554 F. Supp. 667.
37. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553.
38. 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
39. [d. at 277.
40. [d. at 281-82.
41. [d. at 283.
42. [d. at 283-85. The court's narrow construction of the McClure approach is
demonstrated by its reasoning that, "those administrators whose function relates
exclusively to the Seminary's finance, maintenance, and other non-acadelnic department, though ordained lninisters by the Seminary, are not ministers as we used
that label in McClure . ... ' [d. at 285. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit went on to
explain that, "when churches expand their operations beyond the traditional functions essential to the propagation of their donctrine, those employed to perform
tasks which are not traditionally ecclesiastical or religious are not 'ministers' of a
'church' entitled to McClure-type protection." [d.
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could resist compliance with the reporting requirements only if
it could demonstrate that the burden imposed by the requirements would inhibit the exercise of their religious beliefs. 43
Employing the tripartite Free Exercise test, the court in
Southwestern Baptist determined that no such burden existed. 44 Dispositive of the court's holding was the fact that the
Seminary did not hold any religious tenet which required gender discrimination regarding the employee positions at issue. 45 The court thus reasoned that, because "the relevant
inquiry is not the impact of the statute upon the institution,
but . .. upon the institution's exercise of its sincerely held
beliefs, ,,46 application of Title VII reporting requirements did
not impose an impermissible burden for Free Exercise purposes. 47
Only one year later, the Ninth Circuit confronted a sex
discrimination challenge lodged against a publishing association in EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n. 48 On facts
similar to McClure, a female employee charged her former
employer, a church-affiliated publishing house, of unequal payment of similarly situated male and female employees. 49
Despite its affiliation with the Seventh Day Adventist
Church, and the fact that it published only religious materials,
the Ninth Circuit found that the publishing house did not
constitute a "church" for McClure purposes. 50 Moreover, the
employee's position as editorial secretary did not "go to the

43. [d. at 286-87.
44. [d. at 285-87.
45. [d. at 286 ("Since the Seminary does not hold any religious tenet that re-

quires discrimination on the basis of sex, ... the application of Title VII reporting requirements to it does not directly burden the exercise of any sincerely held
religious belief.").
46. [d. at 286 n.8 (quoting EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488
(5th Cir. 1980).
47. [d.
48. 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
49. [d. at 1274.
50. [d. at 1281. In determining the sectarian nature of the publishing house,
the court used the standards established earlier in Southwestern Baptist. In comparing the publishing house to the seminary in Southwestern Baptist, it found
that, "Press' character and purpose clearly are somewhat less sectarian than those
of a seminary." [d. at 1282.
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heart of the church's function in the manner of a minister or
seminary teacher.,,51 This was true even though she held both
administrative and discretionary responsibilities as editor of
the religious magazine. 52
In disposing of the publishing house's Free Exercise challenge, the court concluded that "enforcement of Title VII's
equal pay provision does not and could not conflict with
Adventist religious doctrines .... ,,53 The court based this conclusion on the fact that the Church could point to no religious
tenets allowing wage discrimination on the basis of sex. 54
Thus, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, "preventing discrimination
could have no significant impact upon the exercise of Adventist
belief."55
3. State Adoption Of The McClure Doctrine
Most recently, in 1992, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reaffirmed the viability of the McClure approach to resolving
employment disputes over gender. In Welter v. Seton Hall
University,56 the Court upheld a jury award of $45,000 in
compensatory damages to four nuns who were unfairly dismissed by a religiously-affiliated university.57 The university
had defended its decision to terminate the nuns' teaching contracts based on an order of the Roman Catholic Church which
required the nuns to return to their covenant in Toledo,
Ohio. 58 The University admitted that firing the women violated their employment contracts, but argued that their decision
was nevertheless motivated by religious concerns. 59
In rejecting the University's assertion, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey found the reason advanced by the University to

[d. at 1278.
See id. at 1277.
[d. at 1279.
[d.
[d.
608 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1992).
57. [d. at 208.
58. [d. at 208-09.
59. [d. at 209.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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be pretextua1. 60 Moreover, while the court acknowledged the
authority of the University to designate persons as ministers
free from governmental interference, it adopted Fifth Circuit
reasoning that ''bestowal of such a designation does not control
[an institution's] extra-religious legal status."61 Thus, finding
that the nuns "performed no ministerial duties for Seton
Hall,,,62 the Welter Court decided that the University must be
judged similar to any other employer who engaged in unlawful
discrimination in violation of Title VII. 63
Because the employment contracts did not contain any
canons of the Roman Catholic faith, the court in Welter did not
have to reach the issue of whether the Catholic faith actually
motivated the University's behavior. 64 The court hinted at the
outcome, however, when it observed that, "although the sincerity of a religious institution's belief may relate to a Court's
decision whether to grant a First Amendment-based exemption
from neutral and involuntary regulation, it rarely disposes of a
Free Exercise challenge to voluntarily assumed contractual
obligations.,,65
In this sense, the Welter Court took application of antidiscrimination law a step further than the federal courts; even
if religious beliefs condoned the University's behavior, the
court nonetheless would allow their civil, contractual obligations to govern. 66 Notwithstanding the controversial nature of
this idea, the Welter decision demonstrates the willingness of
both federal and state courts to hold religious employers liable
for discriminatory conduct that cannot be justified on religious
grounds.

60. [d. at 216.

61. Welter, 608 A.2d at 215 (quoting Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283).
62. [d.
63. [d.

64. See id. at 217.
65. [d. at 217 (internal citations omitted).
66. [d.
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4. The Minimal Burden Of Compliance With Title VII On Free
Exercise
While claimants in Title VII cases have not been uniformly
successful,67 the modern tendency of federal courts is to deny
efforts by religious entities to justify discriminatory employment decisions on religious grounds. In those federal and state
courts which follow McClure, this approach has significant
legal implications for churches claiming exemption under the
initial inquiry of Free Exercise test. First, the narrow view
taken by courts of "ministerial" functions indicates that a wide
range of employment positions thought to be beyond the ambit
of judicial resolution in fact lie within the courts' jurisdiction.
Moreover, federal courts' use of the McClure test in determining what constitutes a "church" demonstrates that even pervasively sectarian institutions may be subject to judicial review.
The practical consequence of finding that gender discrimination by a church is unsupported by religious doctrine at the
non-ministerial level means that application of anti-discrimination laws is not only justified, but critical to ensuring the
fair treatment of women in all facets of the employment context that can be reached without violating the Free Exercise
Clause.
More fundamentally, the legal consequence of applying
Title VII to employment decisions is that the less able a church
is to defend sex discrimination on religious grounds, the more
likely it is that any burden on its overall exercise of beliefs will
be regarded as minimal. Along the same lines, it is important
to note that the adoption by the majority of federal courts of a
narrow view of ministerial function manifests their disapproval

67. See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991). In Wuerl, a Protestant school teacher contested the non-renewal of her teaching contract by her
Catholic Church employer. [d. at 945. The Church's decision was based upon its
belief that Little violated core religious doctrine when she remarried without pursuing the prescribed process available from the Roman Catholic Church for validating the marriage. [d. at 945-46. Although the Third Circuit acknowledged the
issues of religious and gender discrimination at state, it nonetheless construed the
Title VII exemption for religiously-motivated discrimination broadly to encompass
employee performance of both "religious activities" as well as indirect religious
functions. [d. at 950. The court thus held in favor of the Church, citing both Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause justifications for its decision. [d. at 951.
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of the practice of gender discrimination. The approach under
McClure could easily have resolved ambiguities regarding the
nature of the employment position in favor of the religious
authority. However, as the decision in Southwestern Baptist
proves, courts are willing to overlook even the fact that an
employee is ordained as a minister if doing so permits the
state to supervise a greater number of employment decisions.
Moreover, as courts increasingly come to view sex discrimination as intolerable, the United States Supreme Court will have
difficulty justifying its current neutral stance towards the
mounting importance of this issue.
B. DETERMINING WHETHER A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
EXISTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE MINIMAL BURDEN ON
FREE EXERCISE

1. Supreme Court Recognition of State Interest In Eliminating
Invidious Forms of Discrimination
In evaluating Free Exercise challenges, courts often utilize
a "balancing test" in which the magnitude of the burden on
Free Exercise is weighed against the state's justification in
regulation. 68 Historically, only those state interests deemed to
be "of highest order" have withstood Constitutional scrutiny
when they are found to burden free exercise rights. 69 Reliance
68. This test originated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-10 (1963); see
supra note 23 discussing Sherbert.
69. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
In Thomas, the Court was asked to rule on the validity of a law denying unemployment compensation to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job due to religious
conflict when his employer assigned him to work on military weaponry. [d. at 709.
The argument against allowing him to recover compensation was the state mandate which routinely denied benefits to any person voluntarily leaving a job "without good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work." [d. at 712. The Indiana
Supreme Court had found that no undue burden would be imposed in Thomas'
Free Exercise rights if he were forced to comply with the state law. [d. at 713. It
further held that ruling in Thomas' favor would effectively violate the Establishment Clause. In an eight-to-one opinion, the Supreme Court reversed both findings. Chief Justice Burger confirmed its prior ruling in Sherbert stating that
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conductproscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,
a burden on religion exists.
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on this standard has led the United States Supreme Court to
strike down conduct, otherwise protected by the First Amendment, which poses a substantial threat to public safety, peace
and order.70 Moreover, the Court has found "certain government interests so compelling as to allow even regulations prohibiting religiously based conduct."71
A good example of the type of state interest the Court
considers sufficiently compelling to override a Free Exercise
claim is demonstrated in Bob Jones University v. United
States. 72 In Bob Jones, the Court reviewed a state decision
denying tax-exempt status to a university that discriminated
in its selection procedures on basis of race. 73 Recognizing "the
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education," the Court upheld the state action, finding no First
Amendment violation. 74
In 1984, the Supreme Court extended its policy of eradicating invidious discrimination when it denied the right of a
private organization to discriminate its membership on the
basis of sex. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,75 the Court
considered the constitutionality of subjecting a non-profit national organization to State anti-discrimination law. 76 The
First Amendment rights of free speech and association were at
issue.
In an opinion notable for its candor, the Court recognized
the magnitude of its holding by stating: "There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs

[d. at 717-18. In addressing the Establishment Clause issue, Chief Justice Burger
quoted directly from Sherbert in finding that payment of benefits represented "the
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences. . . . » [d.
at 720 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409).
70. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
71. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983).
72. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
73. [d. at 577. Based on its belief that the Bible forbids interracial dating and
marriage, the University completely denied admission to Blacks until 1971. [d. at
580. Although the University repealed this policy, its revised policy permitted only
blacks married within their race to apply. [d.
74. [d. at 604.
75. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
76. [d. at 614-15.
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of an association than a regulation that forces the group to
accept members it does not desire."77 Nonetheless, the Court
found the state interest in eliminating gender discrimination to
be "of highest order," and the abridgment of speech and association rights incidental. 78 This was true even though imposing the regulation might "impair the ability of the original
members to express only those views that brought them together.,,79
Critical to the Court's holding in Roberts was its determination that the club's objective to foster the development of
young men's civic organizations would not be undermined if
they were forced to admit women. 80 Using language strikingly
similar to that of lower federal courts, the Roberts Court articulated a test for balancing the club's right of expressive
association against the state interest in regulation. 81 Under
this test, a club's expressive association right is not overridden
by the competing interest in eradicating unlawful discrimination when that interest does not impede the ability of the club
to express its ideals. 82
Put another way, if membership in a particular organization is not conditioned upon adherence to a philosophy of sex
discrimination, that organization cannot posit its belief in that
philosophy as a justification for resisting state regulation of
gender discrimination. Thus, it would appear that, at the time
the Supreme Court was developing the constitutional framework for judging gender discrimination by private associations,
its reasoning was being applied simultaneously by the lower
federal courts against religious institutions.

77. [d. at 623.
78. [d. at 623-24 ("We are persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members'
associational freedoms.").
79. [d. at 623.
80. See id. at 624-25.
81. [d. at 627.
82. [d.
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2. Legal Implications Of Bob Jones And Roberts: Regulating
Discriminatory Conduct By Religious Institutions
The Supreme Court's disposition in Bob Jones 83 and Roberts84 has profound legal significance for the present dispute;
to the extent that religious organizations cannot advance religious justifications for discriminating against women at the
non-ministerial level, the state interest in providing equal
access to those positions for men and women should outweigh
the burden imposed by forcing compliance. Moreover, even
when religious justification does exist, the Court's constitutional jurisprudence with respect to sex discrimination renders
Free Exercise arguments equally unpersuasive.

Bob Jones makes clear that in some instances even religious conduct may be regulated,85 while Roberts establishes
that eliminating gender discrimination constitutes a state
interest of the highest importance. 86 Taken together, these
cases stand for the proposition that the Free Exercise right to
discriminate against women at the non-ministerial level may
be overridden even when exercising that right is mandated by
religious doctrine. Moreover, the fact that a church discriminates, as opposed to a private organization, does not change
the analysis. On the contrary, as the federal cases demonstrate, even those institutions which are so pervasively sectarian that they resemble a church are not exempt from civil liability when they discriminate in an unlawful manner.87 Given
the combined logic of the Supreme Court's and the lower federal courts' decisions, attempts by religious institutions to justify
sex discrimination outside of those employees actually performing ministerial functions are unlikely to survive the Free Exercise "balancing" test even when the state interest is judged
against the strictest standards used by the Supreme Court
thus far.

83. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
84. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
85. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text discussing Bob Jones.
86. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text discussing Roberts.
87. See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277
(5th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 38-47 discussing Southwestern Baptist.
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RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION FROM TITLE VII As .AN OBSTACLE
To THE ELIMINATION OF INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION

The final consideration of the Free Exercise test examines
implementing the state objective. Sherbert requires that the
regulation be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the
state objective and that the state objective be compelling. ss If
the state objective is sufficiently compelling, and exemption
from the regulation would undermine that objective, religious
authorities may be forced to comply with state regulation. s9
In the employment context, efforts to end unjust sex discrimination will be wholly unsuccessful if the church retains
absolute discretion in choosing employees for non-ministerial
functions. The incompatibility between such discretion and the
state objective in eradicating unlawful discrimination is most
clear when that interest is broken down into its two respective
parts: the societal and the individual interest. 9o
1. Societal Interests In Regulating Potentially Discriminatory

Employment Decisions By Religious Institutions
A key state interest in regulating gender discrimination is
the elimination of impermissible and unnecessary discrimination at all levels of employment. The nature of the social interest is such that the larger the segment of the population involved, the more important it is that access to these positions
is not unduly restricted. When society permits churches to
discriminate in the selection of ministers, it is recognizing that
the right to choose religious leaders is distinct from other employment choices. Such decisions underlie the institution itself,
and thus, "the perpetuation of a church's existence may depend
upon those whom it selects to preach its values, teach its mes-

88. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
89. [d. at 406-07.
90. See Mark F. Kohler, Equal Employment or Excessive Entanglement? The
Application Of Employment Discrimination Statutes To Religiously Affiliated Organizations 18 CONN. L. REV. 581, 612-14 (1986) in which the author similarly analyzes the state interest in employment discrimination statutes at the societal and
individual level.
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sage, and interpret its doctrines both to its membership and
the world at large.,,91
Conversely, the more attenuated a particular position is
from the "core" of spiritual beliefs, the greater the state interest in regulating it.92 This interest reflects the fact that the
fewer religious duties involved, the less likely they are to advance the religious mission of the institution. 93 Similarly, the
less a position involves the performance of religious responsibilities, the more likely it is that a broad segment of the population are qualified to fulfill it. Permitting religious institutions
to discriminate at the non-ministerial level thus directly impedes the ability of the state to ensure that the individuals
chosen for these positions are selected according to nondiscriminatory criteria.
2. Individual Interests In RegUlating Potentially
Discriminatory Employment Decisions By Religious
Institutions

The second facet of the state interest involved in regulating church employment decisions is in providing a legal remedy for the individual employee who is injured by unlawful
discrimination. 94 Indeed, Title VII itself outlines the procedures by which individuals may initiate proceedings against
their employers.95 Furthermore, the statutory remedies of reinstatement and back pay are available only to individuals.
When c<?urts overlook the importance of such remedies, they
ultimately undermine the state objective in eliminating unfair
discrimination.
91. Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1168 (4th Cir. 1985). The Rayburn decision addressed the issue of Title VII's application to sexual discrimination in pastoral hiring. Carole Rayburn brought the
complaint against the Seventh-Day Adventist Church following its denial of her
request for employment as an associate in pastoral care. See id. at 1165. Affirming
the district court, the Fourth Circuit held that state scrutiny of Rayburn's claim
would constitute both significant infringement on the Church's Free Exercise
rights, as well as impermissible entanglement with its religious doctrine. Id. at
1171.
92. See Kohler, supra note 90, at 615.
93. Id.
94. See Kohler, supra note 90, at 613.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
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A primary example of this tendency is the Sixth Circuit's
1985 decision in Dayton Christian Schs. v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n. 96 In Dayton, the court reviewed a sex discrimination
claim by a school teacher dismissed from her teaching position
shortly after becoming pregnant. 97 Although a state statute
made it unlawful for "any employer ... to discharge without
just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate [on
the basis of sex],,,98 the Sixth Circuit declined to apply this
statute to the school's actions. 99 This action had the practical
effect of dismissing the teacher's claim. Although the court
identified the state interest in eliminating sex discrimination
from employment as "substantial and compelling," it found
that this state interest did not outweigh the burden on the
school's Free Exercise right to dismiss its own employees. loo
Moreover, the court estimated that the denial of tax exemptions and other public programs to the school represented less
burdensome means of accommodating that state interest. lOl
By declining to review the individual sex discrimination charge
at issue, the Dayton Court completely disregarded the individual interest at stake. Although the Sixth Circuit was later
reversed on appeal, the Supreme Court merely reversed on
procedural grounds, never addressing the merits of the
teacher's claim.l02
3. The Legal And Practical Implications Of Denying Societal
And Individual Interests In Ending Discrimination
Indeed, an issue frequently overlooked by courts and commentators alike, is the way in which judicial indifference to
individual remedies undermines the larger social incentive. 103

96.
97.
98.
99.

766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 934-35.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02 (Supp. 1985).
Dayton 766 F.2d at 961.
100. Id. at 953-56.
101. Id. at 955.
102. See Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n., 477 U.S. 619
(1986).
103. As one observer complained of the ruling in Dayton Christian Sch. v. Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), "the decision grossly underestimated the magnitude of the combined societal and individual state interest and
the degree to which the accommodation of the school's free exercise would undermine [that] interest." See Kohler, supra note 90 at 614.
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Deprivation of individual rights in the face of clear discrimination indirectly discourages others from bringing equally legitimate claims. Without these subsequent claims, the state objective in ending discrimination is not merely disabled, but is
made legally impossible. Most importantly, in overlooking the
combined impact of individual and social remedies, the Dayton
decision makes the exercise of a religious right more important
than both. In focusing exclusively upon the larger social interest in eliminating gender discrimination, it provides the vehicle by which a religious entity may, in certain circumstances,
use their religious liberty to oppress individual rights. Such a
result not only lacks support in language of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, but is repugnant to the Constitution itself.
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which rests on notions
about deference to religious liberty, the Establishment
Clause 104 speaks more to the neutral stance taken by both
religion and government with respect to each other. Specifically, the Establishment Clause forbids "sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity."105 Because most Establishment Clause claims concern challenges to government aid, the Supreme Court crafted
a tripartite test to determine parameters of state involvement:
first, a state law must have a secular purpose; second, it must
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and finally, it must not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. lOG

104. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
105. Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The Court in Walz addressed the legality of tax exemptions for property used by religious organizations
for worship. Concerned about the potential for "excessive entanglement," the Court
found the tax exemptions to be constitutional. [d. at 667-80. The Walz Court's
main basis for concern was the manner in which the elimination of the tax exemption might embroil government officials in litigation against the churches regarding default on tax obligations. The Court thus concluded that such potential
litigation Rosed the requisite level of "ongoing and continuous surveillance" leading
to an impermissible degree of entanglement.
106. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon involved the Court's review of two state programs which involved state funded salary payments to parochial school teachers of students from low socio-economic backgrounds. Chief Jus-
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THE ENTANGLEMENT PRONG

When considering the application of anti-discrimination to
religious institutions, it is the third prong which is most often
implicated and on which opponents of application tend to rely.
One commentator has argued that non-entanglement principles of the Establishment Clause lend substantial theoretical
protection to churches who base their right to discriminate on
religious doctrine. 107 An analysis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to entanglement reveals, however,
that such claims misapprehend the entanglement issues involved in the employment discrimination context.
Past Supreme Court holdings indicate that when religious
entities engage in commercial activity, some measure of regulatory oversight is permitted. lOB As one might expect, in those
instances where the Court has sanctioned such involvement, it
has done so by finding that the regulation at hand ''bear[s] no
resemblance to the kind of government surveillance the Court
has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government
entanglement with religion."109
In 1990, in Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equaltice Burger struck down both programs as violating the excessive entanglement
prong of the Establishment Clause. [d. at 625. Under the programs, the state aid
was to be given only to the secular functions within each program. [d. at 606-607.
This situation, in the Court's opinion, fostered continued government surveillance
over the school in order to guarantee that the funds were being properly allocated.
Id. at 618. The Court concluded that such interaction between parochial schools
and civil authority ran counter to established principles of separation within the
Establishment Clause. [d.
107. Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference
with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984).
108. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California,
493 U.S. 378 (1990); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Tony and
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
109. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 290. In Tony and Susan
Alamo Foundation, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the minimum wage
record keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA")
could constitutionally be applied to a religious foundation which engaged in the
production of various goods to generate revenue. Id. at 305-06. In the Court's
opinion, the FLSA reporting requirements did not impermissibly entangle the government with religion because the regulation was limited to the commercial activity of the foundation; it did not extend to the foundation's religious functions. Id.
at 306.
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ization of California,l1O the Court reaffirmed its position on
non-entanglement when it upheld a state's denial of sales tax
exemption to a religious organization whose funding was generated in part by the sale of religious material. 111 In
Swaggert, the Court determined that because the organization
had a sufficient nexus with the state, it could be required to
collect and report its mail-order sales to California purchasers.112 Critical to the Court's holding was the fact that imposing the tax did not require the state to evaluate the religious
content of material sold, but only the sale of that material, "a
question which involves only secular determination."113 In its
holding the Court thus reaffirmed the principle that "generally
applicable administrative and record keeping regulations may
be imposed on religious organizations without running afoul of
the Establishment Clause.,,114
1. Swaggert Guidelines And Permissive Entanglement
The Swaggert 1l5 decision is important for several reasons. 116 First, Swaggert stands for the proposition that generally applicable legislation is favored over that which has the
effect of curtailing religious liberty.1l7 Because churches could
potentially qualify as employers for Title VII purposes, requiring them to abide by its strictures is entirely consistent with
the tenor and underlying policy of Swaggert which requires
religious institutions to comply with generally applicable laws.
This is particularly true when such religiOUS authorities are
actually motivated by non-religious, rather than religious,
factors. Furthermore, Swaggert demonstrates that the Supreme Court will permit some level of state entanglement with

110. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
111. [d. at 395.
112. [d. at 394-95.
113. [d. at 396.
114. [d. at 395 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97
(1989)).
115. Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 493 U.S.
378 (1990).
116. See supra notes 108-119 and accompanying text discussing Swaggert.
117. The Court's reasoning depends largely on its belief that California's sales
tax does not discriminate against sales of religious materials. As the Court explains, "there is no danger that appellant's religious activity is being singled out
for special and burdensome treatment." Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 390.
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religious entities provided that such involvement is limited to
regulating their secular activities. 118
Finally, the concerns of the Swaggert Court set forth useful guidelines for judging excessive entanglement in the employment context. In applying anti-discrimination laws, court
must consider: first, whether the state is imposing a substantial administrative burden on the institution; next, whether
the proposed regulation involves detailed monitoring and close
administrative contact with the institution; and finally, whether the state must inquire into religious doctrine of the institution in order to regulate its decisions. 119
a. The Minimal Administrative Burden Under Title VII
So long as employment decisions at the non-ministerial
level are not justified by religious tenets, the state does not
violate Free Exercise principles when it reviews those decisions. 12o Similarly, requiring church compliance with state
investigative procedures does not represent an impermissible
administrative burden in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Because charges of sex discrimination involve a limited
and highly specific inquiry, the burden imposed on an institution defending against the charge is substantially less then
that in Swaggert.121 Thus, it is not surprising that the majority of federal courts who permit regulation find the corresponding burden to be minimal. 122
In the 1980 decision of EEOC v. Mississippi College/ 23
the EEOC had attempted to subpoena a university for records

118. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
119. See Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 392-99.
120. See supra notes 21-103 and accompanying text discussing the Free Exercise
Clause.
121. The sales tax in Swaggert extended to the daily operation of the religious
organization in the sale of religious material. Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 379-80. By
contrast, the highly specific nature of an employment descrimination claim would
require an institution to defend a single employment decision or, at most, a particular employment practice at issue.
122. See supra note 28.
123. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
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regarding a hiring decision which passed over a qualified female employee. 124 The University refused to comply with the
order on the grounds that compliance would foster excessive
entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause. 125
Recognizing that Title VII exempted only religious discrimination, and finding no religious tenet which sanctioned the
university's conduct, the Fifth Circuit ordered the University to
produce the documents. 126 The subpoena demanded a list of
all staff members showing their name, race, sex, religion, job
description, pay and educational level. 127 Information pertaining to faculty recruiting and promotion, and access to all administrative positions during the period in issue, were also
required. 128 Despite the comprehensive nature of the investigation, compliance with the procedure was held to be only
minimally burdensome. 129
The same result was reached by the Fifth Circuit one year
later in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary/30 when the Court again reviewed the parameters of
permissible regulation by the EEOC over religious institutions.
Although the Seminary was not under investigation at the
time, the Commission requested that the Seminary submit to
biennial reporting requirements. 131 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the compliance burden was more demanding than
the burden which it upheld in Mississippi College. Nevertheless, it regarded the Seminary's complaints as "largely hypothetical.,,132 Moreover, even though the regulation would be
"ongoing" in a way which was not present in the previous case,
the court determined that, ''because it is not an ongoing interference with the Seminary's religious practices," the administrative burden was "consequently minimal."133 Because the
government sought "merely to gather statistical information"
from the church, the court concluded that an even stronger
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 478.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 487-88.
Id.
EEOC, 626 F.2d at 480-81.
Id. at 487.
651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 279-80.
Id. at 286.
Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5

394

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:369

case for allowing regulation existed than in Mississippi College. 134
Although the decisions of the Fifth Circuit appear to go
beyond the guidelines set forth in Swaggert, a factual comparison proves that the federal decisions are in fact entirely consistent. In Swaggert, the Supreme Court found that the administrative and pecuniary burden did not rise to a "constitutionally
significant level.,,135 Even though the administrative burden
of submitting reports would continue on' a regular basis and
the costs of collecting and remitting the tax amounted to more
than $150,000. 136 Viewed against the facts of Swaggert, the
burden imposed upon the religious institutions in Mississippi
College and Southwestern Baptist can hardly be seen as commensurate. Even when the nature of the compliance burden is
ongoing, as in Southwestern Baptist, such regulation still comports with the regulatory standards in Swaggert. More fundamentally, the burden imposed on religious entities engaged in
gender discrimination is the same as that imposed on any
other organization that discriminates unlawfully. Thus, in the
absence of religious justification, such a result is entirely appropriate under the Establishment Clause.

b. Title VII's Avoidance Of Detailed Monitoring And Close
Administrative Contact

The Supreme Court's decision to allow government surveillance in Swaggert 137 rested upon its belief that the imposition
of the neutral tax law did not create an overly invasive level of
contact between secular and religious authorities. 13B Specifically, the type of involvement prohibited by the state is "on-site
continuous inspection of appellant's day-to-day operations."139
According to the Swaggert Court, such involvement represents

134. [d.
135. Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 394.
136. [d. at 382.
137. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
138. See supra notes 108-119 and accompanying text discussing Swaggert.
139. Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 395 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)).
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the kind of "official and continuing surveillance" which
impermissibly entangles government in religious affairs. l40
Application of anti-discrimination laws to religious authorities successfully eschews this type of prohibited involvement.
Insofar as church practices comport with the strictures of Title
VII, their decisions remain wholly within their discretion,
subject to investigative review only when an actual dispute
arises. Courts struggling with the entanglement issue may
thus rely, as did the Ninth Circuit,141 on the fact that EEOC
actions must be initiated by an employee who files charges
with the Commission. The EEOC itself lacks independent
authority to initiate such actions or issue coercive orders to
enforce Title VII. 142
Furthermore, as the Court held in Swaggert, "routine
regulatory interaction" between secular and religious bodies
"does not of itself violate the non-entanglement command."I43
Thus, if the collection of taxes and attendant record-keeping
satisfies this command, it is difficult to see how entanglement
is any more implicated by record-keeping of employment decisions. On the contrary, because the supervisory authority of
the state typically extends only to situations where an actual
dispute arises, the potential for significant administrative
contact is considerably less than that posed in Swaggert. Federal courts have adopted this exact reasoning in the most recent decisions regarding church discrimination.
In 1993, for example, the Second Circuit concluded that
there was no impermissible contact in the review of an age
discrimination challenge to a pervasively sectarian high
school. l44 In DeMarco, a school teacher contested the

140. [d. at 393.
141. See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982)
(finding EEOC actions did not violate excessive entanglement concern of the Establishment Clause).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988) (recognizing only charges "filed by or on
behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission").
143. Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 395 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. at 69697).
144. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993).
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nonrenewal of his teaching contract under the ADEA. 145 The
school in turn argued that application of the ADEA to its employment decision violated the non-entanglement principle of
the Establishment Clause by generating unwarranted interference with their labor relations policy.146
Following a previous line of federal court decisions, the
Second Circuit held that the "narrow focus of the ADEA" would
not result in the type of "detailed monitoring and close administrative contact" prohibited under Hernandez v. Commissioner.147 The court instead characterized the investigation as a
limited inquiry because the sole question at issue was whether
the teacher was unjustifiably treated differently because of his
age. 148 The court cited Hernandez for the proposition that
routine regulatory interaction is permitted under the Establishment Clause. 149 Application of the ADEA, in the court's
opinion, "requires just such routine regulatory interaction
between government and a religious institution."15o
2. Title VII's Avoidance Of Inquiries Into Religious Doctrine

Because the Establishment Clause mandates that the
government assume a neutral stance with respect to religion,
the most important concern of the Supreme Court in addressing employment regulation is that courts do not become embroiled in ecclesiastical disputes, or, as one commentator put
it, "difficult classifications of what is or is not 'religious,' 'correct doctrine,' or 'worship"'.151 Some commentators argue that
imposition of anti-discrimination law inescapably results in
entanglement. 152 Such an argument, however, fails to comprehend that the essential nature of the employment dispute

145. Id. at 168.
146. Id. at 169.
147. Id. at 170 (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97
(1989».
148. Id.
149. DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 170.
150. Id.
151. Esbeck, supra note 107, at 384-85.
152. See id. at 387; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/5

28

Ellenby: Title VII

1996]

TITLE VII

397

remains the same regardless of the institution which discriminates. Even when a church is involved in the investigation, the
precise issue-whether a particular employee was the victim of
unlawful discrimination-is a procedural, rather than doctrinal, consideration.
At the non-ministerial level, the vast majority of gender
discrimination cannot be defended on religious grounds. 153 In
these cases, a court reviewing a particular decision need not be
familiar with particular religious faith at issue because evaluation of the employer's motives resembles a secular determination. Thus, when a court applies anti-discrimination law to a
religious entity, it is ensuring only that the process by which
men and women are hired comports with legal strictures of
Title VII. Moreover, even when a religious entity does advance
a doctrinal justification, the inquiry may still be one of pretext
rather than doctrine. 154 As the Second Circuit reasoned in
DeMarco, "the inquiry is directed toward determining whether
the articulated purpose is the actual purpose for the challenged employment-related act."155
The strongest argument concerning the potential for excessive entanglement is set forth in Oliver Thomas' analysis of
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. 156 In
Southwestern Baptist, the court determined that, although
members of the Seminary staff were ordained as ministers,
because they did not perform "ministerial duties," decisions
regarding their employment were subject to judicial scrutiny.157 The court delineated as "ministerial" those duties
which included "swearing in offices, conducting wedding and
funerals, and dedicating babies."158 Although the Fifth Circuit
found such standards workable, as Thomas observes, "such line
drawing between religious and non-religious functions involves
significant governmental entanglement with religion and,

153. See supra notes 21-103 discussing the Free Exercise Clause.
154. See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1993);
see also supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text discussing DeMarco.
155. Id. at 171.
156. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 105 (analyzing EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981».
157. Id. at 285.
158. Id. at 284.
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therefore, is highly suspect under the First Amendment."159
Insofar as the right of churches to discriminate depends on
the nature of the employment position in issue, Thomas correctly perceives the potential for courts to become embroiled in
complicated determinations of what constitutes ministerial
versus non-ministerial functions. Nevertheless, it is important
to recognize that "line-drawing" is crucial to the execution and
enforcement of anti-discrimination law against religious institutions. Because legal determinations concerning employment
discrimination by a religious entity depend on whether the employee position is ministerial, courts must have some means of
distinguishing between ministerial versus non-ministerial
duties. Absent a standard, nothing can prevent churches from
prevailing against discrimination claims by defending every
discriminatory decision on the grounds that the employee assumed at least some clergy-like responsibilities.
"Line-drawing" enables courts to differentiate among various employee positions, thereby aiding the process of resolving
disputes where the employee's duties are not easily defined. In
cases where employee responsibilities are clearly non-ministerial, "line-drawing" also reduces the need for particularized
inquiries which the Supreme Court has traditionally sought to
avoid. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence demonstrates that
the state interest in eradicating invidious sex discrimination
may override such First Amendment guarantees as free speech
and the right to associate. 16o If the elimination of gender discrimination is indeed so compelling,161 than this type of "line
drawing" is necessary to accommodate both religious freedom
and gender equality so that the preservation of one does not
occur at the expense of the other.

159. Thomas, supra note 11, at 105.
160. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); see also supra
notes 21·103 and accompanying text discussing the Free Exercise Clause.
16l. See Roberts, 468 u.s. at 623-24.
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE FREE EXERCISE
ANn ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

In evaluating the employment dispute under the Establishment Clause, it is important to recognize the overlapping
Constitutional considerations of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause which theoretically compel the application of
anti-discrimination law to religious entities. Under the First
Amendment, private institutions cannot claim exemption from
anti-discrimination laws when their conduct implicates state
interests of the "highest order".162 Religious entities, on the
other hand, are permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion. 163
As the Free Exercise discussion demonstrates, however,
gender discrimination at the non-ministerial level is generally
not supported by religious doctrine, but rather, represents
secular employment decisions. Therefore, when courts permit
religious institutions to commit sex discrimination outside
ministerial functions, the courts are not only allowing religious
institutions to engage in illegal conduct, but they are insulating the institutions from liability when they do so.
From a constitutional perspective, religious institutions
are being permitted to engage in "secular"-type decisions which
are forbidden to their private counterparts. Consequently, this
legal advantage elevates religious entities above private institutions with respect to generally applicable law; and as the
Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates,l64 this kind of
unequal treatment is precisely the type of promotion and sponsorship "respecting an establishment of religion"165 that the
Establishment Clause historically forbids.

162. See supra notes 21-103 and accompanying text discussing the Free Exercise
Clause.
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1982).
164. See generally, Lee v. Weisman, _
U.S. _ , 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992);
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.s. 602 (1971); Eversen v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1 (1947).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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IV. CHURCH AUTONOMY ANALYSIS
Church autonomy, as the concept suggests, involves the
right of religious institutions to function as autonomous, selfgoverning units when deciding matters of faith, governance or
administration. 166 The Supreme Court has viewed this decision-making authority as an extension of Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause principles, and thus, resolution of ecclesiastical matters is traditionally unreviewable by civil authority.167 Such considerations as church governance and administration are seen as internal matters within the province of the
institution itself.16s
Deference to church decision making in these ecclesiastical
matters has lead Douglas Laycock to conclude that "the right
of autonomy logically extends to all aspects of church operation.,,169 While this notion is not entirely inconsistent with
past Supreme Court rulings, later decisions are hardly as supportive of Laycock's position as he would have us believe.
A. DECLINING STRENGTH OF THE
PRINCIPLE

CHURCH AUTONOMY

In arguing that all church decisions should be immune
from judicial scrutiny, Laycock relies on seminal decisions such
as Watson v. Jones 170 and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese

166. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 89.
167. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). Watson represents the
Supreme Court's first confrontation with internal church dispute. Litigation arose
when the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky, suffered a
split due to an internal mandate that divided its members. In resolving the ensuing dispute, the Court looked to the hierarchial policy within the Presbyterian
Church
and determined that its highest authoritative body, the General Assembly, must
issue the ultimate dispute resolution. [d. at 733-35. The Court adhered strongly to
the notion that Federal Courts are inappropriate to resolve matters involving religious doctrine and thus it was binding on the courts to accept the final rulings of
the General Assembly.
. 168. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976); Keldroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
169. Laycock, supra note 152, at 1397.
170. 80 U.S. (13 WalL) 679 (1871).
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v. Milivojevich 171 which reflect the Supreme Court's early deferential approach to the autonomy issue. 172 In doing so, however, Laycock ignore::; later cases which undercut his expansive
notion of church autonomy.
The first in a line of cases to do so was Jones v. Wolr 3
in which the Court dispensed with the notion of absolute deference. In its place the Court expressly sanctioned the application of "neutral principles of law" to internal property disputes. 174 The Supreme Court thus gave lower courts two alternative methods of resolution when faced with property division disputes: courts could either defer to the "authoritative
ecclesiastical body," or examine religious documents themselves in order to discern legal intent. 175 Although the latter
approach precluded courts from resolving questions of religious
doctrine, this grant of discretion to civil courts, to "substitute
this conventional dispute-resolution method in place of deference," significantly undermined any absolute notion of church
autonomy. 176
1. Dayton And The Denial Of Investigative Immunity
Church autonomy was further eroded with the 1986 decision of Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian
Schools. 177 In Dayton, the Supreme Court finally confronted
the application of anti-discrimination law to a parochial high
school. 178 The school had terminated the teaching contract of
a female employee, Linda Hoskinson, based upon its religious
belief that mothers of infant children should not assume work
responsibility outside the home. 179 In response to the
teacher's charge of sex discrimination, the state initiated an

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

426 U.S. 696 (1976).
Laycock, supra note 152 at 1397.
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
[d. at 602.
[d. at 601.
[d.
477 U.S. 619 (1986).
[d. at 621-22.
[d. at 623.
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investigation of school employment policies. lso The school
promptly refused to submit to the investigation. lsl
The issue ultimately before the court was the right of the
commission to exercise jurisdiction over the school under the
First Amendment. Although the Supreme Court declined to
review the school teacher's specific claim, it unanimously held
that the exercise of jurisdiction over and the investigation of
the parochial school did not violate the First Amendment. ls2
The legal impact of the Dayton decision upon the present
dispute is twofold. First, on its face, the opinion strongly undercuts positive law support for a theory of investigative immunity for religious institutions. This principle, as it translates
in the employment context, means that churches who claim
process-based immunity from enforcement of employment discrimination law must look to something other than legal precedent to support their claim. Moreover, any claim to autonomy·
which rests on entanglement principles is also likely to be
unsuccessful after Dayton.
Although Dayton did not expressly deal with entanglement
issues, and although the entanglement issue primarily raises
Establishment Clause concerns, Laycock believes that "entanglement cases... support a broad rule of church autonomy."lS3 However, the removal of investigative immunity from
the religious institution at issue, and the corresponding involvement between that institution and the state, indicate that
Laycock's theory cannot find support in Dayton.
2. Erosion Of Catholic Bishop

Professor Laycock's reliance on the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago lS4 is equally unpersuasive. ls5 In Catholic Bishop, the Court examined wheth-

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

[d.
[d. at 624.
Dayton, 477 U.S. at 628.
Laycock, supra note 152, at 1397.
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
See Laycock, supra note 152 at 1400.
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er the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "the Act")
would violate the First Amendment by granting the NLRB
power to regulate labor relations between lay faculty and their
parochial school employers. ls6 The Court applied a test which
initially looked at whether application of the Act would raise
serious First Amendment concerns. 1S7 Because it did, the
Court then decided whether Congress expressed an affirmative
intent to apply the Act to religious institutions. lss In the absence of such expression, the Court presumed that Congress
did not intend the statute to apply to the case at issue. ls9
Recognizing that NLRB supervision over the School could
result in excessive entanglement of government with religion,
the Court refused to allow the Board to exercise that power. 190 In a 5-4 opinion which provoked vigorous dissent, the
Court held that, despite the Act's broad definition of "employer," Congress did not intend to bring the school within the
jurisdiction of the Board. 19l
Whether the Catholic Bishop Court was sincere in its
statutory construction of the Act is questionable given the
Court's later language: "We decline to construe the Act in a
manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of
the First Amendment Religion Clauses."192 The Court instead
focused upon the likelihood that resolution of labor practice
complaints by the NLRB would "necessarily involve inquiry
into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school's religious mission."193
Although Laycock emphasizes Catholic Bishop as supporting his argument,194 narrow statutory constructions of Title

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 491.
[d. at 495-96.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 502.
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507.
[d. at 507.
[d. at 502.
See Laycock, supra note 152, at 1399-1407.
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VII have consistently led federal courts to reach the opposite
conclusion. Catholic Bishop has thus been eroded, rather than
followed, by most circuit courts deciding employment discrimination disputes.
In DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School,195 for example,
the Second Circuit determined that application of the ADEA to
a Catholic parochial school did not pose a serious risk of entanglement under Catholic Bishop.196 Although application of the
ADEA would raise serious constitutional concerns, thus implicating the first prong of the Catholic Bishop test, the court
found that ADEA actions did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 197 In comparing the facts of Catholic Bishop to the
case at bar, the court noted "the important distinction between
the ongoing government supervision of all aspects of employment required under labor relations statutes like the NLRA
and the limited inquiry required in anti-discrimination disputes."198 Significantly, the DeMarco court held that, even if
the case did present serious entanglement concerns, the reasoning of Catholic Bishop still supported application of the
ADEA because Congress implicitly intended to apply the
ADEA to religious institutions. 199 Following "principles of
statutory construction enunciated by the Supreme Court in
NLRB,,200 the Court found that "religious institutions that
otherwise qualify as 'employers' are subject to Title VII provisions relating to discrimination based on race, gender and
national origin.,,201
A result similar to DeMarco was reached only a month
later by the Third Circuit in Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed
Virgin Mary School. 202 In holding the ADEA applicable to a
church-operated elementary school, the Court once again considered the distinction between the "pervasive jurisdiction" in
Catholic Bishop versus the "simple prohibitions" of the

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993).
[d. at 172.
[d.
[d. at 169.
[d. at 172.
DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 172-73.
[d. at 173.
7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993).
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ADEA. 203 Unlike DeMarco, however, the Third Circuit did not
reach the issue of Congressional intent, but instead focused
upon the potential for entanglement if the institution was
forced to comply with ADEA policy. Because the Third Circuit
found "an absence of any direct conflict between the ADEA's
secular prohibition and the proffered religious doctrine," it
concluded that there was no need to invoke the interpretive
rule of Catholic Bishop.204
The Geary court's analysis went beyond that of the Second
Circuit in DeMarco by considering challenges to the good faith
of an institution whose proffered reason for an employment
decision may be pretextual. In the Geary court's opinion, such
a determination still would not run afoul of entanglement
concerns in Catholic Bishop.205 Contrary to the Supreme
Court's concern that state regulation of labor relations "necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of [religious entities],,,206 the Third Circuit held that "a conclusion that the
religious reason did not in fact motivate dismissal would not
implicate entanglement since that conclusion implies nothing
about the validity of the religious doctrine or practice and,
further, implies very little about the good faith with which the
doctrine was advanced to explain the dismissal.,,207
Finally, while the Catholic Bishop Court was concerned
with the "process of inquiry" involved in labor relations investigation and its attendant potential for judicial intrusion into
church doctrine, the Third Circuit found such concerns unpersuasive. 208 According to the Geary court, asking an institution
about the motives behind its action, at most, calls upon that
institution to explain the application of its own doctrine. 209
Moreover, because courts are restricted from passing judgment
on validity of this doctrine, "the burden of the religious institu-

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

[d. at 328.
[d.
[d. at 33l.
[d. at 330.
Geary, 7 F.3d at 330.
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
Geary, 7 F.3d 324 at 330.
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tion to explain is considerably lighter than in a non-religious
employer case.'1210
3. Dual Importance Of The Recent Cases Which Erode
Catholic Bishop
While the language of the DeMarco 211 and Geary212 decisions is not couched in terms of church autonomy, their holdings clearly affect the extent to which religious institutions
may regard themselves as self-governing units insulated from
government regulation. Common to both decisions is a tendency to regard discrimination investigations as only minimally
invasive of church autonomy. This tendency in turn fosters a
greater willingness of courts to challenge church authority in a
manner previously reserved for non-religious institutions.
The dicta in Geary is particularly damaging to the notion
of church autonomy because it suggests that even pretextual
inquiries into the good faith of an institution may be condoned
as religiously neutral. Viewing such inquiries as neutral not
only grants the courts greater latitude in investigating discrimination disputes, but an easier means of imposing liability
when discriminatory motives are suspected. Moreover, these
consequences are entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's
Dayton 213 decision which similarly exposed religious institutions to investigative scrutiny. Taken together, the federal
decisions seriously discredit religious institutions who might
resist compliance with anti-discrimination regulation on
church autonomy grounds.
It is important to realize that the DeMarco and Geary
decisions, while ostensibly departing from traditional Supreme
Court jurisprudence, are in fact supportive of the Court's general stance toward church autonomy. Autonomy principles are
in place to ensure that there is no governmental encroachment
into the "substantially religious activities and purpose" of secu-

210. Id.
211. 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993).
212. 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993).

213. Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619
(1986).
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lar entities;214 thus, the rationale which denies exemption
from Free Exercise and Establishment Clause principles applies with equal force to church autonomy. A church which is
unable to justify its non-ministerial employment decisions on
religious grounds should not be permitted to argue in favor of
autonomy concerning the "ecclesiastical" nature of the dispute.
Absent the necessary religious justification, courts are
thus left to rule on the legality of an administrative choice
based on secular considerations or, in other words, a civil issue. 215
B. THE CIVIL NATURE OF RELIGIOUS EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
As the foregoing discussion implies, employment disputes

are neither internal nor purely ecclesiastical. One example of
the way in which religious employment disputes are not internal is the obvious situation when the plaintiff herself is not a
member of the church which discriminates against her. Such a
situation becomes increasingly difficult to classify as "internal"
the more attenuated the position is from ministerial duties.
More fundamentally, the interests protected in civil rights
actions are not only those of the parties themselves, but those
of the public at large. As one commentator observed: "The
content of church policy is an 'internal matter'; the lawfulness
of that policy is not."216 Thus, a compelling reason for holding
churches accountable for their discriminatory behavior is that
religious institutions have enormous capacity to influence behavior and moral convictions far beyond the church polity
itself. Insofar as the treatment of women within a religious
institution indirectly impacts other spheres of society, those
who suffer the consequences of unfair treatment have a vital
interest in the regulation of church behavior.

214. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 50l.
215. See Young & Tigges, Into the Religious Thicket-Constitutional Limits on
Civil Court Jurisdiction Over Ecclesiastical Disputes, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 475 (1986)
(identifying the resolution of such disputes as civil in nature).
216. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption And Religious Institutions: The Case
Of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 409 n.67 (1987).
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1. Traditional Treatment Of Church Autonomy
In the church autonomy context, there is a strong case for
deferring to a religious institution on matters that are genuinely internal to the institution and rest on religious principles.
However, according to the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf,217
disputes over church property are not internal. If such disputes
are outside the exclusive authority of the church, then the
widespread deleterious effects of gender discrimination certainly removes it from being an internal church consideration.
Rather, as one critic of church autonomy concludes, "If Jones
undercuts ex post church autonomy in disputes that are substantially 'internal,' there can be no case left for such autonomy when external interests mount.,,21B
Given the recent federal courts' hostile disposition toward
church-dominated employment discrimination disputes, attempts to wrest church autonomy on ecclesiastical principles
will also fail. In his argument concerning the continued viability of the church autonomy concept, Oliver Thomas looks to the
1987 decision in Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention. 219
In Crowder, the Eleventh Circuit refused to settle a procedural
argument regarding the election of officers within the Southern
Baptist Convention. 220 This refusal to "enter the Baptist
fray',221 led Thomas to conclude that "Crowder is ample testimony to the continued viability of the church autonomy principle.,,222
2. A Departure From Traditional Jurisprudence
Only five years before Crowder,223 however, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire proved that it was not only willing to
resolve an intrachurch dispute, but willing to apply the legal

217. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
218. Lupu, supra note 216 at 409.
219. See Thomas, supra note 11 at 92-93 (discussing Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)).
220. See Crowder, 828 F.2d at 719-21.
221. Thomas, supra note 11 at 93.
222. [d. at 93.
223. 828 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
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standard previously reserved only for private property disputes. 224 In Reardon v. Lemoyne,225 four nuns contested the
nonrenewal of their teaching contracts by their Catholic school
employer.226 Their legal conflict with the authorities of the
Roman Catholic diocese turned on the interpretation of specific
provisions in the contract relating to termination of their employment. The issue was one of contract ambiguity.
Although the Roman Catholic authorities urged the court
to apply the deference rule and deny jurisdiction, the Reardon
court instead cited Jones for the proposition that religious
entities are not totally immune from responsibility under civil
law. 227 Therefore, because the controversy at hand involved
contractual rights outside the doctrinal realm, the court reasoned that accepting jurisdiction and rendering a decision
would not violate the First Amendment. 228 Moreover, the
court concluded that it would be "unfair and illogical to deny
access to the civil courts in non-doctrinal matters to parties
who have voluntarily entered into civil contracts."229
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire authorized the
trial court to resolve the dispute by applying ordinary standards of contract law. 230 In addition to evaluating the reasons
proffered by the school, the trial court could consider "extrinsic
evidence of dismissal practices at the Sacred Heart School and
elsewhere within the diocese.,,231 The Supreme Court warned
against passing judgment on contractual grounds which involved Roman Catholic doctrine, but empowered the trial court
to rule on the sufficiency of "any secular reasons for non-renewal or dismissal."232 Although it recognized the difficulty of
the trial court's task, it nonetheless affirmed that "this task
can be facilitated by keeping in mind the distinction between
224. Reardon v. Lemoyne, 454 A.2d 428 (N.H. 1982).
225. 454 A.2d 428 (N.H. 1982).
226. [d. at 430.
227. [d. at 431 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979».
228. [d. at 431-32.
229. [d. at 432.
230. The case was remanded for a hearing on the merits of plaintiffs' petition
as to the Sacred Heart School Board members and a hearing on the erroneous
dismissal of two defendants. [d. at 434.
231. [d.
232. [d. at 433.
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non-doctrinal matters, wherein jurisdiction lies, and matters
involving doctrine, faith or internal organization which are
insulated from judicial inquiry.,,233

3. Reardon's Impact On Church Autonomy
The Reardon 234 opinion is fascinating because it abides
by the strictures of previous Supreme Court rulings, but points
out the tension inherent in those decisions. Although nothing
in past Supreme Court decisions contemplates the application
of neutral principles of law to contractual disputes, such application is wholly consistent with their underlying policy. The
Reardon court accurately concluded that, because the interests
at stake involved employment and personal welfare, reviewing
the contract did not violate the Supreme Court's prohibition
against inquiry into ecclesiastical matters. On the contrary, by
applying ordinary principles of contract law, the New Hampshire court confirmed the civil nature of the dispute.
The fact that the question at issue in Reardon did not
involve a doctrinal matter also reveals the Establishment
Clause problem inherent in an overly broad notion of "ecclesiastical" dispute. When a civil court either defers to church
authority or dismisses an employment discrimination issue as
nonjusticiable, it undermines the very principles of government
neutrality the Establishment Clause was intended to guarantee. 235 Both methods of resolution, while ostensibly neutral in
theory, have the practical effect of favoring religious entities
because they allow the church to act as the final arbiter in
determining the fairness of its own decisions. 236 Each employment decision made by a church represents an affirmation of
its independent judgment and authority. Thus, whenever a
court declines to address the merits of that decision on First
Amendment grounds, it is essentially permitting that judgment
233. Id. While no mention is made by the Court of the level of insulation such
internal matters might receive, the overall tenor of the decision implies that even
doctrinal matters may not be insulated from judicial inquiry if they sanctioned
discrimination.
234. Reardon v. Lemoyne, 454 A.2d 428 (N.H. 1982).
235. See Michael William Galligan, Note: Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2007, 2021(1983).
236. [d. at 2021.
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to dictate the direction of the law. 237 More important from a
constitutional perspective is that private institutional authority is being denied similar treatment by the courts as are religious institutions. This absence of similar legal treatment
represents a direct affront to the Establishment Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
While policy arguments which underlie the proposed application of anti-discrimination law to churches are mentioned
throughout the discussion, one particular notion raised by an
opponent of such application is worth pointing out. Oliver
Thomas regards religious institutions as important "mediating
structures" not only because they provide meaning to their
adherents, but because their very existence serves as a check
on the power of the state. 238 Thomas thus argues that "invading the integrity of these institutions by regulating their employment policies compromises and limits their role as checks
on governmental power.,,239
The essential point overlooked by Thomas' argument is
that integrity of these institutions is not compromised by the
regulation at the non-ministerial level. When the state is acting on behalf of an oppressed segment of society, it is those
individuals, and not the oppressive religious agents, that are
deserving of such protection. A harm which impacts over half
the human population, denigrating them to a consistently
inferior status can hardly be justified by the competing right of
an institution to hire whomever it wants. No institution has
ever, nor should ever, exist absolutely free of governmental
authority to regulate its functions; at some point the autonomy
of every institution must yield to the legitimate popular interest in gender equality as evidenced by Title VII. In the face of
abusive forms of discrimination, religious agents hardly represent the "family-like buffers" that Thomas defends,240 but instead, a powerful obstacle to the administration of justice for
women.

237. See id.
238. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 107.
239. [d. at 107.
240. [d.
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To date, the Supreme Court has successfully avoided confronting this difficult issue. While the Dayton 241 decision
seemed to make resolution of the controversy inescapable, the
Court's invocation of judicial abstention allowed them to postpone the decision at least a little longer. Nevertheless, given
the resurgence of the issue in federal courts, as well as its
elevation on the feminist agenda, this policy of judicial retreat
is no longer tenable. Moreover, the need for the Court to resolve the issue is further compelled by the fact that churches,
as the targets of an increasing volume of discrimination attacks, have a right to be informed of precisely what forms of
conduct will expose them to liability.
Given the recent change in the Court's composition, one
can at least assume that any decision reached regarding the
issue will be informed by a feminist perspective. 242 Indeed,
while it is not absolutely certain how Justice Ginsburg will
come out on the issue, her commentary concerning "Gender
and the Constitution"243 provides some indication. In the article, she examines the traditional role of women in American
history. With a coincidental choice of words, Justice Ginsburg
laments what she perceives as a theme dominating AngloAmerican literature: "women's place in a world controlled by
men is divinely ordained."244 Throughout history, religious
authorities have had a strong hand in perpetuating this theme.
In the effort to loosen this "divine" grasp, federal courts have
taken the lead and, as the tension between divinity and discrimination continue to mount, the Supreme Court is encouraged to follow.

241. Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619
(1986).
242. On August 3, 1993, seven years after the Dayton decision, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg was appointed to the United States Supreme Court. She replaced
Justice Byron White, becomming the second woman to sit on the nation's highest
court.
243. JUDITH C. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw 125-26 (1992).
244. [d.
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